added experimental code to execute an external command

This commit is contained in:
2018-08-02 17:09:32 +00:00
parent f90adb468e
commit 25243fc7af
4 changed files with 191 additions and 27 deletions

View File

@ -1000,6 +1000,160 @@ static HCL_INLINE int call_primitive (hcl_t* hcl, hcl_ooi_t nargs)
return ((hcl_pfimpl_t)rcv->slot[0]) (hcl, (hcl_mod_t*)rcv->slot[3], nargs);
}
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
extern char **environ;
#define _PATH_DEFPATH "/usr/bin:/bin"
static int is_regular_executable_file_by_me(const char *path)
{
struct stat path_stat;
stat(path, &path_stat);
return S_ISREG(path_stat.st_mode) && access(path, X_OK) == 0; //? use eaccess instead??
}
static char* find_exec (hcl_t* hcl, const char *name)
{
size_t lp, ln;
char buf[PATH_MAX];
const char *bp, *path, *p;
bp = buf;
/* Get the path we're searching. */
if (!(path = getenv("PATH"))) path = _PATH_DEFPATH;
ln = strlen(name);
do
{
/* Find the end of this path element. */
for (p = path; *path != 0 && *path != ':'; path++) ;
/*
* It's a SHELL path -- double, leading and trailing colons
* mean the current directory.
*/
if (p == path)
{
p = ".";
lp = 1;
}
else
{
lp = path - p;
}
/*
* If the path is too long complain. This is a possible
* security issue; given a way to make the path too long
* the user may execute the wrong program.
*/
if (lp + ln + 2 > sizeof(buf)) continue;
memcpy(buf, p, lp);
buf[lp] = '/';
memcpy(buf + lp + 1, name, ln);
buf[lp + ln + 1] = '\0';
if (is_regular_executable_file_by_me(bp)) return strdup(bp);
}
while (*path++ == ':'); /* Otherwise, *path was NUL */
done:
hcl_seterrbfmt (hcl, HCL_ENOENT, "callable %hs not found", name);
return HCL_NULL;
}
static HCL_INLINE int exec_syscmd (hcl_t* hcl, hcl_ooi_t nargs)
{
hcl_oop_word_t rcv;
hcl_bch_t* cmd, * xcmd;
rcv = (hcl_oop_word_t)HCL_STACK_GETRCV(hcl, nargs);
/*HCL_ASSERT (hcl, HCL_IS_STRING(hcl, rcv) || HCL_IS_SYMBOL(hcl, rcv));*/
HCL_ASSERT (hcl, HCL_OBJ_IS_CHAR_POINTER(rcv));
if (HCL_OBJ_GET_SIZE(rcv) == 0 || hcl_count_oocstr(HCL_OBJ_GET_CHAR_SLOT(rcv)) != HCL_OBJ_GET_SIZE(rcv))
{
/* '\0' is contained in the middle */
hcl_seterrbfmt (hcl, HCL_EINVAL, "invalid callable %O", rcv);
return -1;
}
cmd = hcl_dupootobcstr(hcl, HCL_OBJ_GET_CHAR_SLOT(rcv), HCL_NULL);
if (!cmd) return -1;
if (hcl_find_bchar_in_bcstr(cmd, '/'))
{
if (!is_regular_executable_file_by_me(cmd))
{
hcl_seterrbfmt (hcl, HCL_ECALL, "cannot execute %O", rcv);
return -1;
}
xcmd = cmd;
}
else
{
xcmd = find_exec(hcl, cmd);
if (!xcmd) return -1;
}
{ /* TODO: make it a callback ... */
pid_t pid;
int status;
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) return -1;
/* TODO: set a new process group / session leader??? */
if (pid == 0)
{
hcl_bch_t** argv;
hcl_ooi_t i;
/* TODO: close file descriptors??? */
argv = (hcl_bch_t**)hcl_allocmem(hcl, (nargs + 2) * HCL_SIZEOF(*argv));
if (argv)
{
argv[0] = cmd;
for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
{
hcl_oop_t ta;
ta = HCL_STACK_GETARG(hcl, nargs, i);
/* TODO: check if an argument is a string or a symbol */
argv[i + 1] = hcl_dupootobchars (hcl, HCL_OBJ_GET_CHAR_SLOT(ta), HCL_OBJ_GET_SIZE(ta), HCL_NULL);
}
argv[nargs + 1] = HCL_NULL;
execvp (xcmd, argv);
}
_exit (255);
}
waitpid (pid, &status, 0);
HCL_STACK_SETRET (hcl, nargs, HCL_SMOOI_TO_OOP(WEXITSTATUS(status)));
}
hcl_freemem (hcl, cmd);
if (xcmd != cmd) hcl_freemem (hcl, xcmd);
return 0;
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static hcl_oop_process_t start_initial_process (hcl_t* hcl, hcl_oop_context_t ctx)
{
@ -1584,6 +1738,9 @@ static int execute (hcl_t* hcl)
case HCL_BRAND_PRIM:
if (call_primitive(hcl, b1) <= -1) goto oops;
break;
case HCL_BRAND_STRING:
if ((hcl->option.trait & HCL_CLI_MODE) && exec_syscmd(hcl, b1) >= 0) break;
/* fall thru */
default:
goto cannot_call;
}